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Abstract
Political science has for some time been afflicted with an existential and
empirical angst concerning impact and relevance. This is by no means a new
or unique disciplinary pathology, but it is one that has intensified in recent
years. The reasons for this intensification have been explored in a burgeoning
literature on Ôthe tyranny of impactÕ. The central argument of this article is
that a focus on the Ôrelevance gapÕ within political science, and vis--vis the
social sciences more generally, risks failing to comprehend the emergence of
a far broader and multifaceted Ôexpectations gapÕ. The core argument and
contribution of this article is that the future of political science will depend
on the politics and management of the Ôexpectations gapÕ that has emerged.
Put slightly differently, the study of politics needs to have a sharper grasp of
the politics of its own discipline and the importance of framing, positioning,
connecting vis--vis the broader social context.
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In a recent article in European Political Science Capano and Verzichelli (2016;
see also 2010) explored the structural and contextual factors underlying
political scienceÕs Ôrelevance gapÕ. As a rich seam of scholarship illustrates,
debates about the origins, present and future of political science have to some
extent dominated the discipline from its inception (see, for example, Farr, 1988;
Almond, 1990; King et al, 2009). As Philippe Schmitter (2002, 23) argued in
another intervention in this journal ÔThe one thing no one questions is that the
disciplined study of politics is in fluxÕ. In the intervening fifteen years even the
most cursory review of the discipline-focused literature would suggest this state
of flux continues to exist in an ever more pressing form. This article seeks to
draw upon the current situation in the UK Ð for some years a world-leader in
terms of imposing market-based managerialist reforms in higher education that
often have a subsequent ripple-effect beyond its shores Ð to explore and dissect
this situation of ÔfluxÕ in order to understand a set of disciplinary changes that
have not, as yet, been fully understood. Indeed, to focus exclusively on the
emergence of a Ôrelevance gapÕ within political science risks failing to
comprehend the emergence of a far broader and multifaceted Ôexpectations
gapÕ. The core argument and contribution of this article is that the future of
political science will depend on the politics and management of the
Ôexpectations gapÕ that has emerged. Put slightly differently, the study of
politics needs to have a sharper grasp of the politics of its own discipline and
the importance of framing, positioning, connecting vis--vis the broader social
context. The discipline needs to understand its role not just as a creator of
knowledge but also as a knowledge-filter and knowledge-broker. This notion of
an Ôexpectations gapÕ Ð at both the conceptual and empirical level Ð and its
relevance to the future of political science is therefore the focus of this article.
In order to develop this argument, the article strides across a very wide
disciplinary terrain by focusing on three underpinning (and inter-related) issues:
1. The Tragedy of Political Science: In the past, the main
disciplinary debates and schisms have generally concerned
(internal) intra-disciplinary tensions but today they are more
focused on the external challenge of demonstrating relevance
and impact. [The focus on Part I]
2. The Expectations Gap: The imposition of a competing set of
(often contradictory) pressures has resulted in the emergence of
what might be termed an Ôexpectations gapÕ that risks dividing
or splintering the discipline in different ways. [The focus on Part
II]
3. The Politics of Political Science: The debate about the future
of political science might therefore be conceived as one of
managing and closing this Ôexpectations gapÕ. This is what
might be termed the future politics of political science. [The
focus on Part III]
The argument about the future may rest to some extent on a critique of what has
gone before Ð it draws upon narratives of tragedy Ð but overall it is an
overwhelmingly positive argument. Higher education is clearly facing
challenging times, but the current climate will favour those disciplines that are
strategic, proactive and see opportunities where others see only problems. As
such the article offers a very direct, clear and provocative set of arguments that
focus attention on the future politics of political science. By this it means the
framing, positioning and responsiveness of the discipline within the broader
sociopolitical context. Furthermore, as far to say that the Ôrules of the gameÕ
within higher education are changing and the discipline needs to be far more
politically aware and sophisticated in relation not only to playing this game but
in influencing the rules of the game. And yet to talk about the Ôfuture of
political scienceÕ suggests that there is one integrated and homogenous
discipline when in fact we know this is not the case. It also veils the existence
of national variations in how the discipline developed and the existence of
powerful path dependencies that will shape the future. There are also strong
fault-lines running between different sub-fields and within those areas of
analysis that operate at the nexus or overlap between a range of disciplines
(political-economy, constitutional law, public administration, etc.). And yet this
article has no choice but to paint on a rather wide professional and intellectual
canvas with a broad brush, but it is to be hoped that by doing so it will
encourage other scholars to fill in the fine detail and counter-points in later
analyses.
So let me quickly offer a quick account of each of my three arguments.
The tragedy of political science
The tragedy of political science is this: the academic study of politics has
evolved in a direction that Ð across the vast majority of its schools, sects and
tables Ð has generally drifted away from having any clear value or relevance to
those men or women who might seek to use the academic study of politics to
help them make sense of the world. There are clearly exceptions to this broad
statement in the form of individual scholars or sub-disciplines who have
retained a clear social connection, but they are very much the exception rather
than the rule in a profession that has incentivised sub-disciplinary balkanisation,
methodological hyper-specialism, theoretical fetishism and the development of
esoteric discourses. To make such an argument is not to want only engage in the
now fairly widespread intellectual sport of flaying political science but to
simply admit that whereas David Ricci could once write of The Tragedy of
Political Science (1982), thirty years later it would probably be more
appropriate to discuss the ÔtragediesÕ of political science in order to capture the
contradictions and complexities that must inevitably be dissected.
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I have discussed these tragedies in detail elsewhere, and it is sufficient here to
simply note two elements. First, the twentieth century professionalisation of
political science had an incredibly strong internal logic (i.e. it emphasised
scientific methods and theory, but this was never offset by a counter-emphasis
on demonstrating the social relevance, value or impact of the discipline). The
Ôtragedy of political scienceÕ as David Ricci argued three decades ago is
therefore that as the study of politics became more ÔprofessionalÕ and/or
ÔscientificÕ, it became weaker in terms of both its social relevance and
accessibility and as a social force supportive of democracy and democratic
values. In a sense the social and political relevance of the study of politics
simply melted away. To make this argument is not at all to stand alone but to
work within the contours of Bent FlyvbjergÕs Making Social Science Matter
(2001), Stephen ToulminÕs Return to Reason (2003), Ian ShapiroÕs Flight from
Reality (2005), Sanford Schram and Brian CaterinoÕs Making Political Science
Matter (2006) and Gerry Stoker and B, Guy Peters The Relevance of Political
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Science (2013) which each in their own ways speak to a debate about the
reinvigoration of the discipline and a more explicit connection between political
science and contemporary politics and public debate.
This sense of a re-connection flows into the second element of Ôthe tragedy of
political scienceÕ that has little attention within the broader debate but that
highlights the manner in which the disconnection that is now viewed as
problematic was actually viewed as a positive ambition by parts of the
discipline. Indeed, the Ôscientific paradigmÕ explicitly sought to depoliticise the
study of politics by arguing not only that academics could, through the adoption
of a range of techniques derived from the natural sciences, dispose of normative
ÔvaluesÕ and reveal certain social ÔfactsÕ but also that academics should remain
detached from day-to-day politics for fear of Ôdirtying oneÕs handsÕ and
therefore contaminating the purity of the research. (The Caucus for a New
Political Science was established in 1967, as Barrow (2008) explains, in direct
response to the American Political Science AssociationÕs commitment to
political neutrality and non-participation in public debates.) The ontological and
epistemological debates stemming from this position have led to the felling of
many forests and my wish here is not to engage in those debates apart from
highlighting that the depoliticisation of political science through the adoption of
rational choice-theoretical approaches was a dangerous myth that veiled the de
facto imposition of a highly political set of values about human nature and
collective action that could only ever fuel distrust in politicians and public
servants. This is because if the baseline assumption of political science is that
human beings are interested solely in maximising their own selfish utility then
the discipline can only ever breed cynicism, distrust and negativity. Rational
choice theory in particular became less of a predictive science of politics or
deductive method and more of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is for exactly this
reason that Colin Hay (2009) argues that Ôpolitical scientists have contributed
significantly to the demonisation of politicsÉThey trained us, in effect, to be
cynical. And in that respect at least, we have been excellent studentsÕ.
What I have tried to argue in this section is that during the second half of the
twentieth century a Ônew professionalismÕ occurred within political science that
was generally internally focused on theory and methods. It often sought to
(implicitly or explicitly) depoliticise the discipline and led to the emergence of
significant concerns within the discipline that have come to a head in recent
years. This is not to say that Ônew professionalismÕ did not add value or
strengthen the discipline in some respects, or that there were no scholars or sub-
fields that did stay engaged. But it is to argue that Ð overall Ð the discipline
allowed a gap to emerge between its scientific activities and its demonstrable
social relevance. This is not a new argument. ÔWeÕre kidding ourselves if we
think this research typically has the obvious public benefit we claim for itÕ,
Jeffrey Isaac, former editor of Perspectives on Politics, admitted to the New
York Times in October 2009. ÔWe political scientists can and should do a better
job of making the public relevance of our work clearer and of doing more
relevant workÕ. This sentiment resonates with Theda SkocpolÕs view that
political science spends too much time Ônavel gazing and talking to ourselvesÕ
and Robert PutnamÕs argument that as a discipline political science needs to
reconnect and to Ôfocus on things that the rest of the citizens of our country are
concerned aboutÕ. John TrentÕs (2011) analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of political science left him with the impression that it was Ôa discipline in
search of its soul and out of touch with the real world of politicsÕ. The result Ð
in the UK but increasingly around the world Ð has been Ôthe tyranny of impactÕ
and a requirement that scholars increasingly demonstrate not just the academic
value but also the social relevance and demonstrable impact of their publicly
funded research beyond academe. I want to take this argument slightly further.
It is not just that political science became somewhat Ôout of touchÕ but also that
a range of sociopolitical variables have shifted in ways that have changed the
context within which the social and political sciences operate and the
expectations placed upon them. Indeed, the next section argues that an
Ôexpectations gapÕ has emerged and must now be addressed by the discipline
through a focus on both demand-side and supply-side variables. But it also
requires that the discipline is far more astute when it comes to recognising the
changing politics of political science.
The expectations gap
How have the expectations placed upon political scientists actually changed?
How can academics undertake a rigorous assessment of political science? What
common frameworks or conceptual lenses exist for disciplinary analysis? The
simple argument of this section is that the notion of an Ôexpectations gapÕ Ð
derived itself from the spheres of politics Ôas practiceÕ and Ôpolitics as theoryÕ Ð
provides a valuable heuristic framework through which to offer reflexive
capacity (see Ginsberg, 1999; Toje, 2008; Flinders and Kelso, 2011; Flinders
and Dommett, 2013). As Figure 1 illustrates, this ÔgapÕ is formed by the
variance between the realistic level of capacity given the available resource
package (i.e. lower bar) and the public expectations placed upon an individual,
organisation, community, discipline, etc.
Figure 1
Expectations gap.
It could be argued that the existence of a small Ôexpectations gapÕ may well be
positive in the sense that it encourages ambition, reflects external confidence,
forces institutions to consider innovations and adaptations, etc. And yet the
existence of a large expectations gap also risks becoming pathological in the
sense that institutional overload and burnout become real risks. Placed in the
context of academe, in general, and political science, in particular, Figure 1
encourages a form of Ôgap analysisÕ whereby the demands and pressures placed
upon academics and their disciplines (i.e. upper bar) are assessed against some
reasonable conception of realistic capacity (i.e. lower bar). As already
mentioned, the breadth of this article in terms of Ôthe future of political scienceÕ
embraces a broad range of countries, sub-fields and institutions. The pressures
on predominantly teaching-only universities or liberal arts colleges, for
example, are likely to be very different (but not necessarily less) than those
facing Ivy League, Group of Eight or Russell Group Universities in the USA,
Australia and UK (respectively). Indeed, the Ôexpectations gapÕ might be quite
different in nature or size in different parts of the world or between different
parts of the higher education landscape within a polity. But the simple fact is
that from Sheffield to Sydney vice chancellors are increasingly speaking out
about the existence of an untenable gap between supply and demand (see, for
example, Burnett, 2016).  In this context the options for closing the gap
include:
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Option 1: Increasing Supply (moving the bottom-bar up);
Option 2: Reducing Demand (moving the top-bar down);
Option 3: A Combination of Options 1 and 2 (closing the gap from above
and below)
Focusing on the UK provides a valuable starting point not just because it allows
me to draw upon my own professional knowledge and experience but also
because the UK tends to be a test bed for far-reaching reforms that are often
subsequently adapted and replicated around the world. It therefore fits within
future-focused analyses and provides at the very least a starting point for debate
and comparison. The professional expectations on a political scientist in the UK
are generally divided into five broad areas:
1. Research: As displayed through international peer-reviewed publications
and significant external research grant income.
2. Teaching: Evidence of excellence in teaching as displayed through student
feedback and external audit processes.
3. Administration: The capacity to undertake significant administrative and
managerial responsibilities within and beyond your home department.
4. Impact: The ability to demonstrate that your research has achieved a clear,
direct and auditable ÔimpactÕ on non-academic research users and/or the
public.
5. Citizenship: A clear contribution to professional Ôgood citizenshipÕ through
activities such as journal editing, external examining, pastoral
responsibilities, government or parliamentary service, leadership of
learned societies.
And yet stating these five core expectations underplays the existence of
historical, demographic or disciplinary factors that each in their own ways
points to not only a widening of the Ôexpectations gapÕ but also to the existence
of an incentives framework that may operate as an impediment to closing this
gap in the future. Put very simply, the expectations placed upon academics in
the UK and their working environment has changed radically in recent decades.
In the post-war decades up until the 1980 s and 1990 s many academics did
enjoy a rather charmed existence in which research was a choice rather than a
requirement, and impact-related activities almost non-existent. Administrative
duties were minimal, and the age of deference ensured that external audits were
minimal. ÔGood citizenshipÕ was certainly important, but the activities
undertaken within this portmanteau term tended to be undertaken in a rather
leisurely, even amateurish (typically ÔBritishÕ or ÔGentlemanlyÕ) manner.
Teaching remained the core element of an academicÕs role, and even here the
expectations were, through a combination of small student numbers and student
deference, arguably low. Comparing the professional life of a ÔUniversity
Professor of PoliticsÕ Ð to adopt the focus of Bernard CrickÕs 1964 essay on the
changing profession that was appended to the second edition of his Defence in
1964 Ð in the 1960s and 1970s with the situation half a century later might lead
to the comparison offered in Table 1.
Table 1
Initial gap analysis: role shifts in the UK
Element Then Now Evidence
Research 1 4.5
Research Excellence Framework (REF) linked to
institutional rankings and disciplinary distribution
of research funding, plus demands for greater data
access and research transparency
Teaching 3 4.5
Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) assessed
through external audit and including student
assessment as part of marketised environment and
increases in tuition fees
Admin. 1 4.5
Constant quality assurance reviews, recruitment
pressures, research-related bureaucratic
accountability
Impact 0 4.5
REF-related ÔImpact Case StudiesÕ, ÔPathways to
ImpactÕ requirements of research applications, post-
research ÔImpact AuditsÕ
Citizenship 2 4
ÔGood citizenshipÕ now an element of promotion
criteria, contribution to social science capacity part
of grant applications
0 = Non-existent, 1 = optional, 2 = low expectations, 3 = clear expectations,
4 = serious expectations, 5 = intense expectations.
Three caveats need to be made at this point. First and foremost, Table 1 is an
incredibly normative and anecdotal exercise drawn from my own 25 years in
academe and my discussions with former colleagues (within and beyond the
University of Sheffield) about how academic life was for most scholars in the
1960s, 1970s and to some extent into the 1980s. Many more elements of the
role were simply more optional than they are today and the expectations on an
academic were very different. The second caveat is that there clearly were
academics that clearly were producing high-quality research that had a clear
social impact during this period Ð Sir Bernard Crick, the founding professor of
my own department, being a good example Ð but they were exceptional.
Moreover, the relatively low demands on academics in the post-war decades
created space and capacity to engage beyond academe for those scholars who
chose to develop a profile beyond the lecture theatre and seminar room. But
overall Ð as studies such as Jack Hayward, Brian Barry and Archie BrownÕs The
British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century (1999) and Wyn GrantÕs The
Development of a Discipline (2010) undoubtedly suggest Ð a club like, elitist
atmosphere existed within the discipline in the UK from the end of World War
II until the mid-1980s (or more specifically to the introduction of the first
Research Assessment Exercise in 1986).
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There is, of course, a great risk of looking back to some form of Ôgolden ageÕ in
which academics had the time to think, reflect, engage with students, take risks
in terms of their choice of projects, drink sherry and snooze in their offices. An
argument might even be made that the expectations placed upon scholars during
these decades were too low and therefore the bar needed to be lifted and this
was certainly the view of the Conservative governments that were elected from
1979 onwards. Nevertheless, standards in relation to both research and teaching
have undoubtedly increased significantly in recent decades. The question really
when considering the future of political science rests with whether the bar has
been lifted too high and the implications this might have for the future politics
of political science.
However, before focusing on what the politics of political science might look
like in the future it is useful to contextualise and dissect some of the elements
included in Table 1 as a way of demonstrating the potential value of this simple
framework. First and foremost, in the UK the spread of expectations has not
been applied in an even manner across each of the five elements included in
Table 1. Since the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercise in 1986
(replaced by the Research Excellence Framework in 2014) the most distinctive
pressure for political scientists in the UK has been to publish. Research,
research, research was what secured permanent positions and promotions as
departments looked very much to the RAE/REF as an indicator of their quality
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and standing in an increasingly aggressive, international and marketised
environment. The problem was, however, that this pressure to publish came
with additional expectations around methods, language and focus that many
have argued took the discipline along a road to irrelevance (the focus of the
previous section). Placed within the framework of Ernest BoyerÕs ÔTaxonomy of
Scholarly EndeavorsÕ (1997; see also Flinders, 2013a, b) (Table 2, below)
political science had fallen into the trap of over-focusing on Ôthe scholarship of
discoveryÕ to the detriment of other equally important forms of knowledge. The
inclusion of a significant impact-related component in REF2014 was an explicit
acknowledgment by the government that universities needed to focus more on
the integration and sharing of knowledge and its practical application beyond
academe (i.e. BoyerÕs second, third and fourth forms of knowledge). The
planned introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework in 2017 marks a
very similar recognition by the government of the manner in which the
RAE/REF created an overemphasis on research to the detriment of teaching.
Table 2
Ernest BoyerÕs Taxonomy of Scholarly Endeavors
1. The
Scholarship of
Discovery
Pushing back the frontiers of human knowledge through
research
2. The
Scholarship of
Integration
Placing discoveries into their larger scientific and social
context
3. The
Scholarship of
Sharing
Knowledge
Disseminating the finding of research and its implications
within and beyond the lecture theatre and seminar room
4. The
Application of
Knowledge
The rejection of any false wall between ÔpureÕ and ÔappliedÕ
knowledge and the capacity to demonstrate some notion of
social relevance
The issue, however, is that the current evolution of political science in the UK
reveals a general layering of additional demands and expectations upon
academics alongside a number of fairly obvious professional inconsistencies or
competing pressures:
¥ To trespass across disciplinary and professional boundaries while also
displaying increased hyper-specialisation;
¥ To enjoy Ôacademic autonomyÕ and Ôintellectual freedomÕ in an increasingly
directive and constrained environment;
¥ To increasingly engage with quantitative methods and Ôbig dataÕ while also
producing nuanced, accessible and fine-grained analyses;
¥ To manage the temporal misalignment between academe timescales and
politics in practice;
¥ To be able to Ôtalk to multiple publics in multiple waysÕ while
acknowledging a constant pressure to Ôtech-upÕ within political science;
¥ To cope with a system where the incentive structure still pushes scholars
towards ÔpureÕ scholarship and peer reputation rather than ÔappliedÕ
scholarship or public reputation;
¥ To navigate the problematic relationship between facts and values, and the
prevailing rhetoric of neutrality in research;
¥ To innovate and share Ôbest practiceÕ while also working in a competitive
market environment;
¥ To deliver world-class research and writing while also providing excellence
in teaching;
¥ To provide a personalised student-centred learning experience in a climate
of mass and often digitally refracted access.
¥ To take risks in what is generally a risk-averse professional environment;
¥ To balance a traditional focus on Ôproblem-focusedÕ political science with
external demands for Ôsolution-focusedÕ political science;
¥ To ensure that research informs public debate without being Ôdumbed
downÕ or co-opted by partisan actors;
¥ To be responsive to Ôstudents-as-customersÕ while upholding academic
standards and relationships; and
¥ To achieve some notion of a personal, private or family life while fulfilling
the demands of the role.
Three dominant issues flow out of this blur of competing pressures and resonate
with the general thrust of the argument illustrated in Table 1. First and foremost,
participation rates in higher education have changed dramatically. In 1950 just
3.3 per cent of young people in the UK went to university; by 1970 the rate was
8.4 per cent; and in 2015 the rate was nearer fifty per cent (over half a million
young people taking up a university place). In the 1960s and 1970s small group
teaching would generally take place in an academicÕs office and involve no
more than a handful of students; in the 1990s small groups had expanded to ten
or twelve students; and today small groups are often closer to twenty-five or
thirty students in number. (The one-to-one tutorial system that has been at the
heart of Oxbridge teaching system for centuries is under increasing financial
strain.) One early impact of the TEF is that universities have engaged in almost
a bidding war to increase levels of teaching contact time for students that will
have obvious knock-on consequences for staff research capacity.
Knock-on consequences, however, for some staff more than others. Indeed, one
of the key challenges for political science is undoubtedly to address the equality
and diversity agenda with more vigour than has hitherto been the case (for a
discussion see Flinders et al, 2016). Although the study of politics attracts a
broadly 50:50 ratio of men and women at the undergraduate level in the UK,
less than a third of tenured political scientists in the UK are female (less than
fifteen per cent of the professoriate is female and under four per cent from a
black or ethnic minority background). As the APSA Task Force on Political
Science for the Twenty-First Century illustrated, such inequalities within the
discipline are by no means unique to the UK. The simple fact would seem to be
that the discipline has perpetuated a hidden politics whereby women have
implicitly or explicitly been steered towards those elements of the profession
that have traditionally been less highly valued in terms of promotion (i.e.
teaching, administration, good citizenship). At the same time the recruitment
and external research audit framework prizes those with a sustained record of
publication and grant capture and works against those who may have had career
breaks. Third (and finally) what this very brief review of the current situation in
the UK reveals is a shift away from what night be termed the traditional Ôall-
rounderÕ academic towards the modern Ôspecialist scholarÕ. Traditionally British
universities have maintained a broadly egalitarian approach whereby all staff
are expected to undertake at least some element of teaching and administration.
The exception to this was generally where staff had secured teaching Ôbuy outsÕ
through external research grants but in the last two or three years a bifurcation
between teaching-only and research-only staff is beginning to emerge. The two
extremes of this bifurcation are reflected in a growing academic ÔprecariatÕ
consisting generally of younger new entrants to the profession who are expected
to accept either a succession of temporary (and generally teaching-focused)
contracts or to undertake an even more precarious academic existence on the
basis of a portfolio of fractional roles undertaken concurrently at several
different universities. At the other end of the spectrum, however, is the
emergence of a cadre of tenured Ôhigh-impactÕ academics who enjoy a visibility
within the practitioner and media spheres. The ÔstretchÕ or ÔspanÕ of an academic
career has therefore widened significantly in response largely to the imposition
of external audit regimes and higher expectations. The malleability of some
institutions has reached breaking point and this is reflected in the manner in
which some teaching-focused universities have dropped out of the REF process
and some research-focused universities are threatening to boycott the
forthcoming TEF process (see Havergal, 2016). And yet my sense is that this
fragmentation appears to be locking-in rather than challenging a number of pre-
existing inequalities within the discipline. For example, the research professors
and Ôhigh-impactÕ professors generally make little contribution in the sphere of
institutional or academic governance and undertake little (if any) teaching. They
are also generally men.
The simple argument of this section is that the expectations placed upon
political science have grown in recent years. This has created an Ôexpectations
gapÕ that must somehow be managed or ideally closed. It is the politics and
management of this ÔgapÕ that will define political science in the future. The
question is therefore one of how this gap might be managed and the nature of
the political strategy that should be adopted.
The politics of political science
The status and future of political science is fragile in many places. Just as
society is changing then so must political science evolve and adapt. To some
extent the evolution of the discipline has arguably not kept pace with the wider
social context and this helps explain why such concern about the Ôrelevance
gapÕ has emerged (the New Economics Movement, the rise of Public Sociology,
etc.). In this regard the discipline is not alone and similar debates about Ôroads
to irrelevanceÕ have been the focus of strong debates elsewhere. And yet as the
Ômaster scienceÕ a healthy, flourishing and engaged discipline of political
science has never been more important in terms of its potential social
contribution. In this regard C. Wright MillsÕ arguments about Ôthe trapÕ and Ôthe
promiseÕ of the social and political sciences remain stronger now than when The
Sociological Imagination was first published in 1959. But, as Capano and
Verzichelli correctly suggest, political science is now under considerable
external pressure to modify its inherited cultural and cognitive features. Put
slightly differently, the emphasis is now on engaged scholarship Ð very much of
the form advocated by C. Wright Mills Ð and this is clearly reflected in large
funding schemes such as the EUÕs Horizon 2020, or the multi-billion pound
Global Challenges Research Fund in the UK. The questions then are how the
discipline might (1) react to the changing socio-economic context, (2) ensure
that potentially restrictive cultural and institutional path dependencies do not
constrain its social impact and (3) remain an Ôhonest brokerÕ in the Pielke-ian
sense (2007).
The short answer to these questions Ð and with the expectations gap that
appears to have emerged in mind Ð is that a new politics of political science is
necessary, or a new professionalism that permeates down from learned
societies, professional associations and funders, through institutional units and
to individual scholars. That is a new politics that is Ð quite simply Ð more aware
of the external context in which sciences take place and that balance internal
expertise and external engagement. More specifically the nexus between
academe and society must form the focus of greater attention and, as a result,
the role of an academic is likely to change. As the Brexit debate in the UK
illustrated, politicians will always ignore or seek to reinterpret research that
does not suit their partisan needs, but there is a far wider community of
potential research users than the discipline generally recognises. The dominant
perception of a clear qualitative distinction between ÔpureÕ and ÔappliedÕ
research will have to be recast in a more dynamic mode of understanding. More
specifically, there will have to be some understanding of the manner in which
ÔimpactÕ can actually underpin, nourish and nurture excellence in terms of both
research and teaching. Once again, the Ônew politicsÕ or Ônew professionalismÕ
will have to understand the knowledge ecosystem in ways that have largely
been forgotten but must now be rediscovered if the discipline is to prosper. The
exact nature of this new disciplinary strategy will be for national associations
and institutions to decide, but in terms of offering elements of this Ônew
politicsÕ the following ideas are worthy of consideration.
Firstly, political science cannot and should not adopt a victim mentality but a
more robust and confident professional persona. In this regard the role of the
main learned societies is vital as the source of external promotional activities
and more specifically as the driver of proactive knowledge-brokeridge,
knowledge-filtering and knowledge-framing activities. Put within the
framework of Figure 1, the role of learned societies and professional
associations has to support the discipline in terms of raising the lower bar of
realistic capacity where possible while paying far more attention to their
external/strategic role in actually managing the expectations of the public and
policy makers vis--vis the upper bar (i.e. Option 3, above). Put simply, learned
societies and professional associations must take the lead in closing the
expectations gap from above and below. In this regard, relatively simple steps
can yield significant returns. Of particular significance, for example, given the
temporal misalignment between academe timescales and politics in practice is a
clear approach to horizon-scanning so that translated packages of research can
be prepared and delivered to research users (media, practitioners, etc.) at
specific Ôwindows of opportunityÕ when the demand for such information will
be high. Moreover, learned societies, in partnership with funders and research
users, should also take the lead in terms of innovating in relation to both
training and bridging activities.  Secondly, there needs to be a generational
approach to student recruitment that moves the focus down the educational
pipeline so that students in schools and colleges appreciate exactly what the
study of politics involves and why it matters, its potential in both intellectual
and vocational terms and the available professional career paths via higher
education. This educational pipeline provides a critical tool through which to
understand and address long-standing issues concerning diversity and inequality
and Ð beyond this Ð to democratise the study of politics to exactly those sectors
of society who appear to have become disenchanted.
A third element is highly political and involves the colonisation of the broader
research community in terms of places on the boards of research bodies,
government advisory bodies, international non-governmental organisations,
media organisations, etc. My sense is that other disciplines have been far more
professional and ambitious in terms of monitoring when places on influential
organisations are advertised and then encouraging (and supporting) members of
their discipline to apply. This allows the discipline to be embedded and have
tentacles far beyond the university sector and to have ambassadors in key posts.
Once again, this regular vacancy monitoring and proactive encouragement is
fairly low cost but potentially incredibly important for the external profile and
visibility of a discipline. The targeting of professional appointments can also be
built into a more ambitious equality and diversity agenda, while also being of
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value to the individual academic in terms of their Ôgood citizenshipÕ
requirements and the need for impact-related or research-related networks.
(This targeted approach to recruitment also works in the opposite direction in
the sense that professional associations and learned societies might also usefully
include a number of non-academic research users on their boards.) What these
three elements really point to is the manner in which the ÔscientificÕ and the
ÔpoliticalÕ (or the ÔacademicÕ and the ÔpublicÕ) components are both mutually
interdependent Ð almost positively parasitical in the sense that they feed upon
each other Ð within a modern academic career where the professional
responsibilities of academics to the public who fund their work are increasingly
explicit. In this regard claims to be delivering more research of a higher quality
will carry little weight if that research does not percolate through into the public
sphere in accessible and purposeful ways. Without this Ônew politicsÕ political
science will be politically disadvantaged (and therefore structurally
disadvantaged in resource terms) vis--vis other disciplines in a climate of
already shrinking resources.
AQ3
Notes
1 Readers might be interested in a new COST Action Group on ÔThe
Professionalisation and Social Impact of European Political ScienceÕ
(ProSEPS) that is headed by Gilberto Capano and was launched in
September 2016.
2 See, for example, Burnett, K. ÔCash Starved Campuses must raise fees or
drop standardsÕ, Times Higher, 1 Sept. 2016.
3 For a broad statement on the current expectations gap in the UK see
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/cash-starved-campuses-
must-raise-fees-or-drop-standards.
4 The success of the ÔTotal ExposureÕ project in the UK being a particular
example of low-cost, high-reward activities that build long-term networks
that span professional boundaries. https://www.psa.ac.uk/totalexposure.
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